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Courts and Consequences: The Impact of Terrorism on
U.S. Participation in the International Criminal Court
Mark Champoux'

Constitutional issues and tbe objectives of U.S. foreign policy, especially regarding terrorism, dictau tbat the United States should not rarifY the Rome
Statuu in in pmmt form.

T

he past year has seen the ratification by the necessary number
of states for official creation of che International Criminal
Court (ICC) under the Rome Statute, and the ICC is currently
undergoing preparatory meetings before it begins regular proceedings.• The many argum ents supporting U.S. ratification of the
Rome Statute are widely varied, as are the arguments opposing it.
The idea of international cooperation is certainly appealing and no
one seriously opposes the idea of prosecuting persons responsible
for the gross crimes included under the jurisdiction of the ICC. 2 Indeed, most would hope chat increased international cooperation
could reduce che frequency of crimes such as genocide, rape, and
corrure and promote greater peace in the international system by requiring greater accountability. Yet, complex issues such as jurisdiction, state sovereigm:y, and constitucionality have made a[(empts at
such international judicial cooperation especially difficult. The
track record of past attempts is decidedly mixed, and many of the
most significant advances in international criminal proceedings are

Champoux is from Lee's Summit, Missouri. H~ is a junior majoring in political sciwith a minor in business management. Mark is married to the former Jenny Johnson,
:md he plans on beginning law school in the full of 200+
'Rome Starure of the Imernational Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONE 183/9, 17 July
1998, <http://www.un.orgllaw/icc/statute/romefra.htm>, JO November 2002.
'The four offenses outlined in the Rome Treaty: genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes, and aggression.
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coo recent to be judged effectively. ' Furthermore, progress cowards
consens us is hi ndered by extremists on both sides of che argumenc:
on the one hand, chose who argue char international law is dysfunctional and irrelevant and that U.S. sovereignt y is incompatible with international organization s of any substance; and on the
ocher hand, chose who would assume away any constraints of constitutionality while arguing for U.S. participation in any international organization at any cost, decrying any unilatera l U .S. action as morally wrong. As is usually the case, the truth lies
somewhere in between.
Recent acts of terrorism have added a new facet co the U.S.
debate. Supporters of the ICC have used terrorism as another justification for U.S. ratification of the Rome Statute. They argue
chat the ICC will promote peace and stability in the international
system and help deter and react against all future acts of international criminal aggression, including terrorism. Furthermore, they
argue chat the U.S . refusal co support the ICC will only strain tensions with allies or would-be allies, making the fight against terrorism more unilateral and more difficult. Such arguments, however, are somewhat deceptive in that they emphasize only possible
outcomes of U.S. participation or non-participation in the ICC
while still overlooking the present fundamental difficulties in U.S.
ratification . Just because the nation has recently been reminded of
the horrors of terrorism does not mean that the U nited Scates
should definitely participate in the ICC . Rather, constitutional issues and t he objectives of U.S. foreiJgn policy {especially regarding
terrorism) dictate cha t the United States should not ratify the
Rom e Statu te in its present form. Also, because of Haws in irs organization and jurisdiction, it is highly uncertain if the ICC will
in face become an effective judicial body. Furthermore, arguments
that che ICC will aid the war on terror are unclear and unsupported. Rather, it is very possible that che functions of the ICC

1
For example: Nuremburg Trials, International Court of Justice, International Criminal
Tribunals on the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, World Trad~: Organization dispute sertlem<:nt sysrem, as well as nuny other bilateral and multibreral judicial tribunals.
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may actually obstruct the U.S.-led fight against international terrorism with or without U.S. ratification. A discussion of these
issues highlights the need for more serious debate of alternative
options for international judicial cooperation.
RATIFICATION WouLD BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Much has been said regarding the constitutionality of ratification of the Rome Statute, so the following is only a brief review of
the important constitutional concerns. 4 One fundamental constitutional problem for the ICC lies in its assertion of "universal jurisdiction" over "territorial jurisdiction" in prosecuting acts committed in the United States by Americans. The other main problem is
the possible prosecution of Americans for alleged crimes committed
overseas, which would be unconstitutional because of U.S. participation in an ICC that does not meet the requirements of the Bill of
Rights.
Ratification of th e Rome Statute would allow ICC jurisdiction
over acts committed in the United States by Americans and others
on the basis of universality. ~ Such jurisdiction is in direct contrast
with the principle of territoriality, which has long been the basis of
international legal authority. In Girard v. Wilson , the Supreme
Court unanimously concluded that "a sovereign nation has exclu sive jurisdiction to punish offenses against its laws committed
within its borders, unless it expressly or impliedly consents to surrender jurisdiction." 6 In other words , the ICC would have no jurisdiction within the United States unless the U.S. vested judicial authority in the ICC. Such a court, however, is not authorized by the
Constitution and therefore could hold no legitimate jurisdiction on
U.S. soil according to the ruling in the landmark case of Ex parte

• For a more complete ·"discussion of the questions of constitutionality, see Lee A Casey, uThe
Case against the Imernational Criminal Court," Furdham !ntrmatiunal Law journal 25 (2001):
84o-71. This paper closely follows many of Casey's arguments concerning constitutionality.
) Rome Statute, supra note 1.
• Girard v. \Vzlsun, 354 U.S. 52.4 (1957), 519.
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Milligan.' In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that the military
tribunal of Lamdin Milligan, a Confederate sympathizer, had no le~
gitimate judicial authority, but that all such authority was vested
'"in one Supreme Court and such inferior courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish."' 8 Clearly, the ICC
would not satisfy the Constitutional requirements of being ordained
or established by Congress under Article III. Because the ICC does
not satisfy these and other requirements, such as trial by jury or the
Appointments Clause, it could never legitimately or constitutionally
prosecute criminal offenses committed on U.S. soil by Americans.
Supporcers of the ICC have argued that the ruling in Ex parte
Quirin overturned the decision in Milligan.' Lee Casey advances the
Milligan argument by distinguishing it from the ruling in Ex parte"
Quirin. Specifically, he shows that Quirin does not, in fact, overrule
or limit Milligan:
In Quirin the Court ruled that a group of men, recruited in Nazi
Germany as saboteurs, could be tried and condemned by military
commission. Such commissions are not "Article Ill" courts, and
they are not bound by the Bill of Rights. They are also incapable
of lawfully trying civilians-a rule required by Milligan and fully
accepted by the Court in Quirin. In fact, the Quirin Court carefully distinguished lvfilligan, explaining that the accused in that
case "was not an enemy belligerent either entitled to the status of
a prisoner of war or subject to the penalties imposed upon unlawful belligerents." The defendants in Qt4irin, however, were nor
civilians, but "unlawful combatants ... subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts which render their belligerency unlawful." Such individuals, ruled the Supreme Court,
are neither entitled to trial in the Article III courts, nor tO the protections of the Bill of Rights.'"

This distinction between Qui1·in and Milligan makes it clear that the
ICC, which would prosecute civilians as well as lawful and unlawful
' Ex part~ Milligdn, 71 U.S. 1 (1866).
• Ibid., 121, quoting U.S. Constitution.
• Ex part~ Quirin, 317 U.S. I (19-ll).

" Ca.-;ey ~l!pra nore 4• 853-4·
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combatants, could not constitutionally have jurisdiction on acts
committed within the United States by Americans.
Despite the "exclusive jurisdiction" of U.S. judicial authority
over acts committed by Americans within its own territory, a strong
argument can be made that the international community or State
parties to the ICC can exercise "universal jurisdiction" for the offenses outlined in the Rome Statute, regardless of where they occur.
Indeed, recently many states have used universal jurisdiction as the
basis for their prosecution of criminal acts committed outside of
their own territory. However, the legitimate use of universal jurisdiction is far more limited than ICC supporters claim. Historically,
the only two generally accepted universal offences have been piracy
and slave trading. Both of these aces, however, rake place on rhe
seas, outside of jurisdiction by any single state. In nearly all other
cases, territoriality has been favored over universality, even for the
gross offenses of the Rome Statute.
Recent alleged uses of rhe principle of universali ty can be better
understood in terms of preference for territoriality. For example,
Spain's effort co extradite former Chilean dictator Pinochet from
Britain was partly based on the fact that some of Pinochet's victims
were Spanish nationals. The Nuremberg Trials and the similar trials
in Japan at the end ofWWII did not claim legitimacy by universality, bur rather by rhe rights of rhe victors of Germany and Japan to
legislate for the occupied terri tories. 11 Similarly, the princi pie of territoriality explains why the United States can extradite American
civilians to be prosecuted in non-Article III courts when their
crimes were committed abroad or when their actions create a criminal effect in another country, as well as why the U.S. can exercise
jurisdiction over acts commitced abroad that directly affect Ameri can citizens and interests. 12 Such evidence shows the importance of
territoriality over universality in international law and in U.S. Constirurionallaw. Vesting power in the ICC to exercise universal jurisdiction to prosecute Americans for offenses committed on American
11

Th~ Nurrmbn-g Trial, 6

"N~~/y v.

F.R.D. 69 (1946), 107.

Hmlu/, r8o U.S. 109 (1901).
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soil involving only other American ctttzens would, therefore, be
unconstitutional and unprecedented.
ICC prosecution of Americans for alleged crimes overseas
would also be unconstitutional should the United States ratify the
Rome Statute. The Supreme Court ruling in United States v. Balsys
suggests that U.S. involvement as an ICC State party would require Bill of Rights guarantees for prosecution of American citizens}3The case specifically ruled char Bill of Rights guarantees are
not required when an American ci tizen is prosecuted by a distinctly foreign court for crimes committed in other territories,
making extradition legal in such cases. But U.S. involvement in
foreign prosecution makes such prosecution "as much on behalf of
the United States as of che prosecuting nation," making Bill
of Rights guarantees necessary.•• Therefore, I CC prosecution of
Americans overseas, if the United Scares were a State party, would
require protections of the Bill of Rights. Many of these protections, however, are nor provided for under the Rome Stature. For
example, the C ivil Law system of the ICC does not provide for
trial by jury, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. •s Similarly
provided by the Bill of Rights and not guaranteed in the ICC are
the provisions that trials be held "in the state wherein the crime
shall have been committed," that the accused has a right to confront "the witnesses against him," and others} 6 Since such protections are not available under the current ICC , the United States
cannot constitutionally participate in such a court that could potentially prosecute Americans.
Finally, ICC proponents claim that U.S. Constitutional concerns
have been addressed by the principle of "complementarity," meaning

" Uniud Srar~s v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666 (1998).
~< [bid.,

698.
" U.S. Constitution, amend. 6.
•• Ibid. The right to confront witnesstS excludes the possibility of anonymous witnesses and
most forms of hearsa~· evidence. Both anonymous witnesses and virrually unlimited hearsay
evidence have been allowed in the lntern:uional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
the modd for the ICC. See also Michael P. Scharf, Ba/Jran justict' 7, no. 67 {1997): 1o8-9.
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that the ICC's jurisdiction is complementary to state jurisdiction.
The Rome Statute includes measures which make cases inadmissible when the state that has jurisdiction is either already prosecuting or bas investigated and decided to not prosecute. •· This, ideally, would prevent unnecessary prosecution by the ICC when the
state with proper jurisdiction is already raking appropriate legal actions. However, the Rome Statute eliminates these limitations of
jurisdiction if it is judged chat a state "is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution" or when the
decision to not prosecute "resulted from the unwillingness or inabili ty of the state g·enuinely to prosecute." ' 8 T he opportunity for
supplanting national jurisdiction based upon potentially politically
motivated or otherwise uninformed decisions by a non-reviewable
ICC does not provide much of a safeguard for American constitutional concerns.
Certainly, many other well-informed arguments are being made
for and against U.S . participation in the ICC with regards to constitutionality. This discussion highlighted only some of the better
arguments being made against participation. Both inside and outside of courtrooms, many interpretations can be made of the Constitu tion with its accompanying case law. Because of this, the decision for U.S. participation in the ICC should probably not be
made solely on the basis of constitutionality. Indeed, constitutional
requirements do not exclude the possibility of institutionalized international cooperation in criminal prosecution. Yet, such constraints cannot simply be assumed away so as to expedite U.S. participation, even if at the expense of international cooperation in
the short run. To do so would be setting a dangerous precedent for
U.S . policy. Finally, acts of terrorism, from the past or in the future, do not change the fundamental constitutional conflicts surrounding ratification of the Rome Starute.

'"Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(1).
" Ibid., an. 17(2).
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THE ICC

Besides issues of constitutionality and regardless of U.S. involvement, the International Criminal Court faces other challenges that
will affect its ability co effectively prosecute international crimes, including acts of terrorism. These include difficulties resulting from
the ICC's organization and guidelines and also the problematic
overall mission of the ICC. Some of these problems are specific to
prosecution of terrorism, while others apply to all potential areas
where the ICC may prosecute.
First, perceptions of justice and fairness, which are the basis of
any judicial system, are not the same across all societies. Even the
Common Law of Great Britain and the United States is strikingly
different than the Civil Law of Continental Europe. Still other judicial systems in Asian and Arabic nations are far different. Such
variation produces a confused international perspective on the roles
of judges, prosecutors, juries, and case law. Some of these differences have been gradually overcome by experience with previous international tribunals, but none of those experiences compare in
scope and in depth to the proposed ICC. Though such confusion
can be n egotiated and clarified in preparatory commissions, it certainly still lends to the difficulty in establishing a legitimate and
powerful International Criminal Court.
The organization of the ICC is also very prone to politicization.
The selection of a prosecutor and judges by election of the Assembly
of State Parties is likely to reflect the political competition evident
in any and all situations where a position of authority and potential
power might be obtained. Also, the prosecutor and others in the
ICC will certainly be influenced by competing political and ideological notions when deciding whom and how to prosecute. Some
have even argued that, as a result of political competition, "the ICC
will be 'captured' not by governments but by NGOs and others with
narrow special interests and the time to pursue them." 19 Such
'' John R. Bolton, "Courting Dmger: What's Wrong with the International Criminal
Court," NarioMI lmmst (Wmcer 1998/99): 65.
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politicization would not be surprising, given the record of other
"independent" bodies of the UN system.
The potential for politics, however, is not necessarily a major
cause for concern by itself. Experience has shown that the effects
of politics are best contained within a system of institutionalized
separation of powers and checks and balances. Some of the most
severe criticism of the Rome Statute has focused on the lack of
such institutions within the ICC. The Rome Statute does not include any possibility for review or reversal of ICC decisions by another independent body. The prosecutor and judges are left largely
unaccountable and able to investigate and prosecute as they wish.
The Security Council is explicitly left without oversight authority,
and so the ICC is left accountable only to itself. The strongest
mechanism of accounrability in the Rom e Statute is the possibility for the Assembly of State Parties to vote to remove the prosecutor or judges for "serious misconduct" or a "serious breach" of
duty (majority vote for the prosecutor and two-thirds for
judges). 20 This, however, is an insignificant gesture of accounrability compared to what most modern democracies deem necessary
for their similar institutions. On this s ubject, Professo r Alfred
Rubin refers to Plato when he questions, "Who guards the
guardians?" The potential for politicization combined with a lack
of mechanisms for accountability creates even more uncertainty
for potential legitimacy and effectiveness in the ICC. 11
Further criticism has focused on the problematic definitions
of crimes in the Rome Statme and the uncertain future of other
crimes that may be .included. A definition for the crime of aggression has not yet been agreed upon for inclusion in the Rome Statute
and will require a 7/8 vote by State parties for approval. The United
States has argued against inclusion of this crime from the beginning
on the premise that the UN Charter delegates the right to define aggression to the Securi ry Council. Still other definitions suffer from
,. Rome Stature, supra nore I, art. 46.
" See also Alfred P. Rubin, "The Inrernational Criminal Court: Possibilities for ProsecuroriaJ Abuse," Law and Contemporary P,·oblems 64 (2001): I5J·
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vagueness or otherwise include details that the United States may
not be able ro accep t Y Furthermore, the Rome Statut e allows for
future prosecutio n of other crimes that can be included by twothirds m ajo rity vote by the Assembly of State Parties. 23 Though such
flexibility is probably needed for an institution that wishes to function for an extended length of time, the uncertainty that this provision creates only further damages the legi timacy and effectiveness of
the ICC and weakens any possibility for U.S. participation.
Although there are many problems with the organizational
structure and guidelines directing the ICC, the most critical problem is its overall scope or purpose. Oddly enough, most of the discussion for and against U.S. ratification of the Rome Statute has
dealt with issues that are negotiable, such as d efinition s of crimes
and poli tical accountability. In such discussions, the question of
why the world needs an ICC is often forgotten. In the United
States, conservatives have often written off the Rome Statute only
because it would create a substantive international body that might
require signifi cant U.S. cooperation or even possible concessions of
international authority. Some liberals, on the other hand, have
often complained that it is a disgrace that the United States continues to stubbornly oppose an idea that the res t of the world, including our closest allies, support, leaving us in the small company of
n ations like Iraq. Both of these stances tend to overlook the question of whether or nor the world system needs an ICC.
Along these lines, John Bolton observes that the purpose of the
ICC is flawed because it cries to "transform matters of power and
force in ro matters oflaw."u Indeed , though there are similarities between the traditional offenses of criminal law and those listed in the
Rome Statute, there are also fundame ntal differences. For example,
genocide, aggression, crimes against hum anity, and war crimes are

"' Bolcon, 62-3. Bolton specifically cites problems in the definition of genocide th:u would
conflict with the defmirion that the U.S. Senate approved when it ratified the Genocide Convention in 1986.
'·' Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 9·
''Bolton, 66.
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usually carried our on a somewhat nationwide basis, and their effects
are not appropriately measured in a monetary value or even in lives
lost but in damage to society and to rhe human race. Can legal proceedings really deter these effects or even properly punish the
guilty? If legal proceedings are appropriate, in what ways is the current system inadequate, and how does the ICC improve that? Alfred Rubin asks , "Would the effect of a conviction be to change
the notion of victory in [a] batde?"!S It becomes difficult co see
how an ICC could truly change much at all in the international
system. Where crimes are truly a matter of power and force, law
can do little. For the situations in which such criminals may be
prosecuted, it seems the legal systems currently in place are able to
manage. One hypothetical example might summarize the dangers
of an ICC with unnecessary purpose and scope. If an ICC existed
in the x86os, how would it have affected the United States following the Civil War? Would leaders from the Confederacy and the
Union be prosecuted and jailed by rhe IC C for brutal military action carried our by both sides? Such an outcome would seem very
possible, given the atrocities of rhe Civil War and the likely unwillingness of a Lincoln administration to investigate or prosecute.
How would such convictions affect the rebuilding nation? Undoubtedly, probable ICC actions would nor reflect Lincoln's hope
co "bind up th e nation's wounds" with "malice toward none, with
charity for al1." ~6
PossiBLE CoNsEQUENCES OF THE

ICC

oN TERRORI SM

How, then, does the issue of terrorism affect the prospects of
the ICC? Is there a lack of good current options in prosecuting
terrorists chat would somehow make the ICC m ore appealing and
legitimate? There are, in fact, many good options, especially given
the global scope of terrorist activity. This is in direct contrast to
claims that the ICC is a good option because terrorism is a global
"Rubin, 67.
"'Abrnham Lincoln, "Second lnaugrnal Address.~ 4 M:~rch 1865.
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problem. Furthermore, the United States, which is leading the war
on terror, is likely to use its influence and abilities to exclude the
ICC from any participation in terrorist prosecution. It remains
that the ICC will have a negligible role, if any at all, in aiding the
war on terror.
The exception would be future terrorist activities that do not affect rhe United Stares but that affect nations that support the ICC.
Yet, the nature of terrorism is such that almost no nation would ever
purposefully give up jurisdiction to prosecute criminals that harmed
their own people. Though terrorism is a global problem, each case is
a unique tragedy to an individual nation. Not allowing those nations
to prosecute, according to their own laws, the terrorists that caused
them harm, would in no way aid the war on terror.
Though it is not likely, the only role left for the ICC with regards to terrorism would be possible prosecution of military officials from the United Stares and irs allies for alleged crimes committed overseas in fighting against terrorism. Granted, this is an
unlikely possibility, and critics of the ICC have expressed exaggerated fears of this kind of outcome. It is hard to imagine a situation
in which a U.S. military official overseas could be guilty of a crime
chat falls under the jurisdiction of the ICC, and it is even more unlikely that the ICC would investigate and prosecute. However, it
does remain a possibility.
The most likely effect the ICC could have on terrorism would be
in affecting political situations that are the motivations of terror.
The best example is Israel and Palestine. Leaders of both sides could
probably be investigated and prosecuted should the ICC assert jurisdiction. Ideally, such legal action might improve the situation. Past
experience in the Israeli- Palestine conflict, however, dictates that
legal action would hardly solve anything, especially since the ICC
has virtually no perceived legitimacy in that region. It is more likely
to deepen the conflict, resulting in a possible escalation of terrorism.
Indeed, much of terrorism in the world is motivated by such situations, and the prospects for improving those situations by ICC legal
action are very uncertain.
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THE BEST LEGAL RESPONSE TO TERRORISM

First, it should be clear that the ICC is not the best legal response
to terrorism. What, then, can be done to improve the prospects of
the ICC? Certainly, increased international cooperation ought to be
a goal for all nations. Though integrating domestic and international legal systems is a much more complicated task than integrating trade regulations, it is still not impossible. The current proposal
in the form of the Rome Sta tute, however, is too flawed to be easily
repaired. But just as planning for the UN Charter was benefited by
learning from the mistakes of the League of Nations, lessons learned
from disputes regarding the Rome Statute have paved the way for
possible unprecedented progress towards a more effective and legitimate international criminal judicial organization. Indeed, even
Henry Kissinger, a strong critic of the ICC, predicts that "in time,
ir may be possible to renegotiate the ICC statute to avoid its shortcomings and dangers." 1' Until then, the ICC should have no role in
prosecuting terrorists.
Ultimately, legal action of any kind will not resolve the conflict
with terrorism. Mark Drumbl, a proponent of international tribunals for prosecuting terrorists, admits that "trials . . . are not a
panacea. The mere process of investigating crimes, holding trials,
and gaveling accountability will not restore peace to war-torn regions nor pacifism to religious extremism." 18 Fighting terrorism is
a matter of force and power, not of law. Terrorism is fought wi th
international cooperation in gathering intelligence on and apprehending terrorist cells and leaders, in tracking and freezing terrorist
funds, and in promoting peace and stability in those regions where
terrorism thrives.
Even so, legal action is important-tO appropriately prosecute
criminals and to bring resolution to victim nations and individuals.
l?

Henry Kissinger, "The Pitfulls of Universal Jurisdiction,» Forl'ign Affairs 8o, no. 4 Ouly/August

1.001): 95·

""Mark Drwnbl, "Judging the
(:t002): J6o.
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In such cases, there are already many good outlets for prosecution
in domestic systems. Certainly, the United States would like to use
its very capable domestic courts and military tribunals to prosecute
terrorists that cause harm to Americans . In fact, most nations are
capable of appropriate prosecution according to their own laws.
Possible jurisdictional overlap between nations can be resolved on a
case-by-case basis, as has always been the case. Extradition can
occur just as usual. In the few nations with inadequate judicial systems, the UN has authority to provide assistance for domestic prosecution. Last of all, many have discussed rhe possibility of civil suits
regarding terrorism, especially against those who fund or otherwise
aid terrorists. All of these outlets, and others, are already in place
and are advantaged by decades, if not centuries, of experience and
backed by societies who wish for an end to terror. Even if the ICC
were fully functional and more capable, it is hard to see a good reason to take away jurisdiction from domes tic courts to prosecute terrorists. The composite argument, then, is char the United States
should not rarify the Rome Statute or support any future ICC proceedings. To fight terror, the United States and other nations should
cooperate and use all possible means of power and force to end terrorist activities. Where legal action is appropriate, jurisdiction
should be left to domestic courts.

